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Documents published by ENIQ, the European Network for Inspection and Qualification, 
belong to one of the following 3 types: 
 
 
Type 1 — Consensus Document  
A consensus document contains harmonised principles, methodologies, approaches and 
procedures, and stresses the degree of harmonisation on the subject among ENIQ 
members. 
 
 
Type 2 — Position/Discussion Document 
A position/discussion document may contain compilations of ideas, expressions of opinion, 
reviews of practices, or conclusions and recommendations from technical projects.  
 
 
Type 3 — Technical Report 
A technical report is a document containing results of investigations, compilations of data, 
reviews and procedures without expressing any specific opinion or valuation on behalf of 
ENIQ. 
 
 
 
The present document “ENIQ Recommended Practice 11: Guidance on Expert Panels in RI-
ISI” (ENIQ Report nr. 34) is a Type 1 document. 
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FOREWORD 
 
The present work is the outcome of the activities of the ENIQ Task Group Risk (TGR) 
on Risk Informed In-service Inspection (RI-ISI).  
 
ENIQ, the European Network for Inspection and Qualification, was set up in 1992 in 
recognition of the importance of the issue of qualification of NDE inspection 
procedures used in in-service inspection programmes for nuclear power plants. Driven 
by European nuclear utilities and managed by the European Commission Joint 
Research Centre (JRC) in Petten, the Netherlands, ENIQ was intended to be a 
network in which available resources and expertise could be managed at European 
level.  It was also recognised that harmonisation in the field of codes and standards 
for inspection qualification would be a major advantage for all parties involved, and 
would ultimately increase the safety of European nuclear power plants. More 
information on the ENIQ network and its activities can be found at 
http://safelife.jrc.nl/eniq/. 
 
ENIQ work is carried out by two sub-groups: the Task Group on Qualification (TGQ) 
focuses on the qualification of in-service inspection (ISI) systems, and the Task Group 
on Risk (TGR) focuses on risk-informed in-service inspection (RI-ISI) issues. The 
TGR has published the European Framework Document for Risk-informed In-service 
Inspection, and is producing more detailed recommended practices and discussion 
documents on several RI-ISI-specific issues. 
 
The Framework Document recommends the use of an Expert Panel to review the 
selection of safety-significant sites before the inspection programme is finalised. 
However, more detailed guidance regarding the responsibilities, composition and 
working procedures of an expert panel is not provided. This ENIQ Recommended 
Practice is meant to assist users of RI-ISI applications in how to form, prepare and 
facilitate an expert panel as a part of a RI-ISI process.  
 
The members of the ENIQ Task Group on Risk are:  
 
V Chapman    OJV Consultancy Ltd, United Kingdom 
C Cueto-Felgueroso   Tecnatom, Spain 
D Lidbury    Serco Assurance, United Kingdom 
A Eriksson    JRC, European Commission, The Netherlands 
C Faidy    EDF, France 
R Fuchs    Leibstadt NPP, Switzerland 
L Gandossi    JRC, European Commission, The Netherlands 
L Horacek    NRI, Czech Republic 
G Hultqvist    Forsmark Kraftgrupp AB, Sweden 
E Kichev    Kozloduy NPP, Bulgaria 
P Lacaille    Areva, France 
A Leijon    Ringhals AB, Sweden 
J Lötman    Forsmark Kraftgrupp AB, Sweden 
K Enger   Ringhals AB, Sweden 
P O’Regan    EPRI, United States 
T Schimpfke    GRS, Germany 
B Shepherd    Doosan Babcock, United Kingdom 
K Simola    VTT, Finland 
J Slechten    Tractebel, Belgium 
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A Toft    Serco Assurance, United Kingdom 
A Walker   Rolls-Royce, United Kingdom 
A Weyn   AIB-Vinçotte International, Belgium 
 
This ENIQ type 1 document was approved for publication by the ENIQ Steering 
Committee. The authors of this report are Kaisa Simola VTT, Luca Gandossi JRC, 
Anna Mengolini JRC, Carlos Cueto-Felgueroso Tecnatom and Anders Leijon Ringhals 
NPP. Professional proofreading was carried out with the assistance of DGT's Editing 
Unit. 
 
The voting members of the ENIQ Steering Committee are:  
 
R Chapman   British Energy, United Kingdom 
P Dombret  Tractebel, Belgium 
K Hukkanen   Teollisuuden Voima Oy, Finland 
R Schwammberger  Kernkraftwerk Leibstadt, Switzerland 
B Neundorf   Vattenfall Europe Nuclear Energy, Germany 
J Neupauer   Slovenské Elektrárne, Slovakia 
S Pérez   Iberdrola, Spain 
U Sandberg   Forsmark NPP, Sweden 
P Kopcil   Dukovany NPP, Czech Republic 
D Szabó   Paks NPP, Hungary 
 
The European Commission representatives in the Steering Committee are A Eriksson 
(JRC, European Commission; ENIQ Network Manager) and T Seldis (JRC, European 
Commission; Scientific Secretary to ENIQ). 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Framework Document for Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection (RI-ISI), 
published by ENIQ [1], is intended to provide general guidelines to utilities on how to 
develop RI-ISI approaches and to use or adapt already established approaches to the 
European nuclear environment, while taking account of national regulatory 
requirements and utility-specific characteristics. 
 
The Framework Document recommends the use of an expert panel to review the 
selection of safety-significant sites before the inspection programme is finalised. 
However, more detailed guidance regarding the responsibilities, composition and 
working procedures of an expert panel is not provided.  
 
This European Network for Inspection and Qualification (ENIQ) recommended 
practice is meant to assist users of RI-ISI applications in how to form, prepare, 
conduct and facilitate an expert panel as a part of a RI-ISI process. A recommended 
practice is a document produced by ENIQ to support the higher level Framework 
Document. Users are free to use these recommended practices at national level, as 
they see fit. The complete list of ENIQ recommended practices is reported in 
Appendix 2. 
 
The development of guidelines for the expert panel process in this area has also been 
recommended by the Nuclear Regulators Working Group (NRWG), which explicitly 
advocates the use of Expert Panels in its report on the regulatory experience of RI-ISI 
[2]. However, the NRWG specifically acknowledged that the use, function and 
necessity of an expert panel will depend on the RI-ISI methodology applied. 
 
In the drafting of this document, European experience and US recommendations and 
practice on the use of expert panels have been considered [3-7]. 
 
The main objectives of this recommended practice are to give guidance on: 
 
• Responsibilities of the expert panel 
• Composition of the expert panel 
• Planning and preparation of the expert panel 
• Conduct of the expert panel 
• Documentation of the expert panel 
 
It is important to recognise that an expert panel can have a different role and 
composition, depending on the organisation and resources of the RI-ISI project. An 
expert panel can be an independent review body, as described in the Framework 
Document [1] in the context of a possible management structure, which largely 
consists of members external to the RI-ISI project so far. On the other hand, an expert 
panel can also be formed for an internal review of the failure probability and 
consequence analyses, without broad external involvement. In this case, it is a forum 
to ensure a systematic review of analyses and balanced use of information and 
expertise from several disciplines in the decision-making process. 
 
Although the guidance provided in this document mainly targets an expert panel to 
review risk ranking, a similar approach can be adopted to forming and conducting a 
panel for the purposes of making the final selection of inspection sites. Furthermore, 
an expert panel can be used to review and approve periodic re-assessments and to 
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assess the impact of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) updates on the RI-ISI 
programme. 
 
 
2 ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF EXPERT PANELS IN RI-
ISI  
 
Risk-informed applications, such as RI-ISI, make use of probabilistic safety 
assessments (PSAs), together with other relevant analyses, with the final goal of 
making safety-related decisions. This requires not only a comparison of quantitative 
risk estimates and deterministic calculations, but also a balanced combination of more 
qualitative expertise from several technical areas. A risk measure calculated with the 
aid of PSA models is not the only decision criterion, as insights from several other 
disciplines must be integrated in the decision-making process. 
 
In general, the role of an expert panel is to synthesise the views of various experts 
and identify and characterise the uncertainties in their analyses. A structured 
approach is needed in order to find a balance between the (often contrasting) 
arguments of experts representing different disciplines. Furthermore, an expert panel 
is important as it compels the different experts to openly discuss the technical bases 
of their arguments both among each other and with the decision-maker. 
 
The overall responsibility for an expert panel process lies with the plant operator 
(licensee), who is responsible for ensuring that the panel is composed of suitably 
qualified and experienced persons, and that the combined experience of panel 
members is appropriate to the task at hand. 
 
Within a RI-ISI process, the expert panel is responsible for reviewing all the pertinent 
information that has led to the initial risk ranking and for proposing the final risk 
ranking of the elements or segments within the scope of the RI-ISI application. 
 
The initial risk ranking is based on the evaluations of probabilities and consequences 
of failures (COF) of structural elements or segments. In its review, the expert panel 
should consider the sensitivity of results, identify limitations in analyses and consider 
additional aspects that may influence the final ranking and selection of sites to be 
inspected.  
 
The expert panel should use qualitative and quantitative information from PSA and 
failure probability evaluations, in combination with traditional engineering insights, and 
design basis information. In all its activities, the expert panel has to take account of 
the key role of the defence-in-depth concept [8, 9]. 
 
More in detail, the expert panel review process should cover: 
 
• Verification that the technical basis for defining the scope of the programme is 
sound. 
• Verification that the system boundaries are clearly defined and that the 
delineation of piping segments can be justified. 
• Verification that the failure consequences assessed for each segment are 
accurate (both direct and indirect). 
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• Verification that the procedures for estimating failure probability have been based 
on appropriate databases, analytical methods and/or Structural Reliability Models 
(SRMs).  
• Verification that, when SRMs have been used, the limitations in the models and in 
the key input parameters have been assessed [10]. 
• Verification that the estimated failure rates have addressed the limiting failure 
type (small leak, disabling leak or break), the relevant failure mechanisms and 
ageing effects, normal and design-limiting loadings, design and fabrication factors 
and material properties. 
• Verification that the estimated failure rates are consistent with plant operating 
history. 
• Verification of the consistency of classification among segments within a system 
and between systems. 
• Verification that uncertainties have been properly considered and treated. 
• Review of the selected piping segments in order to identify any proposed 
relaxation in inspection requirements from prior practices and assess their effect 
on plant safety. 
• Consideration of strategies other than inspection. 
 
The expert panel may upgrade the risk classification of a segment or an element 
based on economic and other non-safety-related considerations. The expert panel 
may also downgrade the risk classification of a segment or element if properly 
justified. 
 
An important responsibility of the panel is to ensure complete transparency of the 
process, properly recording and documenting all decisions and the underlying 
justifications, so that the process is open to scrutiny. 
 
 
3 COMPOSITION OF AN EXPERT PANEL 
 
The following principal players are identified: the decision-maker, the RI-ISI project 
leader, the panel leader, the panel members and the panel technical secretary. 
 
The Decision-Maker, typically a senior employee of the utility, is the person 
responsible for approving the final decisions of the panel. The decision-maker is 
typically not a member of the panel itself, but may take part in the discussions of the 
panel. 
 
The RI-ISI Project Leader is the person responsible for the RI-ISI application. He/she 
has to ensure that all the relevant information is made available to the expert 
panellists. To avoid conflicts of interest, the RI-ISI project leader should not serve as a 
member of the expert panel. 
 
The expert panel should be guided by a Panel Leader (chairperson, facilitator). This 
should be an individual with thorough knowledge and experience of the whole 
technology process of the nuclear power plant (NPP). He/she should be independent 
from the process itself (i.e. not involved in any of the technical analyses or 
calculations carried out to obtain the initial risk ranking). The panel leader should be 
skilled in leading a team of people who are not necessarily under his/her management 
line. Independence from the process is meant to allow the leader to take an objective, 
unbiased view. The leader should have appropriate interpersonal skills to facilitate the 
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process and help the group to overcome contrasting opinions and personalities to 
ultimately achieve a consensus.  
 
The expert panel should contain several Panel Members, individuals with expertise in 
all the relevant technical areas related to the RI-ISI process. The panel members 
should be experts in their specialist field and, additionally, have a good general 
understanding of the risk-informed ISI methodology, good knowledge of plant and 
system operation, good understanding of the existing ISI programme and knowledge 
of the piping failures experienced at the plant. The experts could be from either inside 
or outside the utility. 
 
The following expertise should be covered by the members of the expert panel: 
 
• probabilistic safety assessment (PSA); 
• structural integrity and piping design and stress analyses; 
• materials engineering and piping failure operating experience; 
• in-service inspections and non-destructive evaluation (NDE); 
• plant operations; 
• plant maintenance; 
• plant engineering. 
 
Finally, the expert panel should also have a member with responsibility for taking 
accurate minutes of proceedings, known as the Technical Secretary. This person 
should not be an ordinary secretary, but rather an individual familiar with the RI-ISI 
process, to ensure that all the important technical points discussed are appropriately 
captured in the minutes and thus duly included in the process documentation. He/she 
could additionally support the panel leader, for instance, by noting suggestions and 
deferred problems and bringing them up at a later date. 
 
It is the responsibility of the utility to ensure that the expert panel has sufficient size 
and resources to carry out and complete its work properly. 
 
Non-voting Experts in Attendance can be invited by the panel leader to provide 
additional information and support the work of the expert panel on specific issues, as 
needed. 
 
Table 1 summarises the various roles of the participants in an expert panel.  
 
It is recommended that a representative of the Safety Authority join the expert panel 
meeting as an observer. This enables the safety authority to understand the work of 
the expert panel, and provides the authority with the technical background needed to 
judge the final decisions of the panel. Early involvement of the safety authorities is 
likely to be advantageous for all parties involved in the acceptance of the RI-ISI 
programme. 
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Table 1  Expert panel participants and their roles 
 
Participant Role 
Panel Leader  
• Leads discussions  
• Facilitates communication between experts 
• Works towards achieving a consensus 
• Assists the Technical Secretary in reporting 
• Develops forms/worksheets for facilitating the panel’s work, if 
needed 
• Designates an expert panel member to act as vice-Panel Leader 
Panel Members 
(technical experts) 
• Review the analyses, take part in discussions  
• Suggest changes or agree with the analyses 
• Comment on the summary report 
Technical Secretary 
• Takes minutes of the proceedings 
• Assists the Leader in structuring the discussion 
• Prepares a summary report, summarising the discussions and 
the results of the expert panel process 
Other (non-voting) 
participant(s)  • Provide information and support to the expert panel, as required 
Other parties involved (not members of the independent Expert Panel) 
Decision-maker 
• Presents the strategic view and role of the decision 
• Responsible for making the final decision 
• May take part in panel discussions 
RI-ISI Project 
Leader 
• Responsible for collecting information for the panel 
• Presents the case to the panel and takes part in discussions 
• Comments on and accepts the final report 
 
 
4 PLANNING AND PREPARATION OF THE EXPERT PANEL 
 
To ensure that the expert panel process is a success, a certain amount of preparatory 
work is needed. This includes the collection of all the relevant material and information 
on which decisions will be made and the training of panel participants. It is also worth 
using standard forms for information summaries and reporting. 
 
 
4.1 Collection of material and preparation of forms for facilitating the panel 
 
The project leader should ensure that all the relevant material is available for all 
panellists well before the beginning of work. 
 
This information should include the following: 
 
• relevant background information concerning the nuclear power unit of which 
the system is a part; 
• a schematic representation of the system which clearly illustrates boundaries 
and segments; 
• system description, including the design function of the system and a clear 
definition of the safety functions; 
• segment boundaries; 
• current ISI programme; 
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• PSA analyses, and all other relevant assessments, carried out to evaluate the 
failure consequences; 
• analyses carried out to evaluate the failure probabilities; 
• other considerations (shutdown risk, flood, fire, seismic, operation and 
maintenance insights, other deterministic insights, etc.); 
• resulting risk ranking. 
 
To aid the expert panel, it may be useful to prepare in advance element/segment 
information forms. These forms or worksheets should include the necessary 
information in a structured and easily readable form. The worksheets can be used 
during the panel sessions to document and review discussions and comments on 
each element/segment discussed. These forms should be distributed to the experts in 
advance. 
 
An example of a worksheet is given in Appendix 1.  
 
 
4.2 Training for participants of the expert panel 
 
All participants of the expert panel should receive sufficient training in the RI-ISI 
application. This should include the application of risk analysis techniques for ISI. The 
following is a list of training topics: 
 
• risk ranking process (risk importance measures, threshold values, the impact 
of assumptions and uncertainties on the results); 
• failure probability models; 
• failure mode assessment; 
• consequence of failure assessment. 
 
It is advisable that at least one working day should be set aside for the training of 
panel members prior to commencement of the real work of the expert panel. 
 
A crucial element of the training is to ensure that the panel members have a clear and 
common understanding of their responsibilities and of the objectives of the process. 
These issues should be made very clear before starting the panel sessions. Training 
should be duly documented. 
 
 
4.3 Time planning 
 
Experience has shown that approximately one working day should be planned for the 
analysis and review of a piping system, but of course this is highly dependent on the 
number of elements/segments to be reviewed. 
 
The need for iteration should be envisaged. Some time should be pre-allocated 
should the panel require the collection of additional information or the completion of 
further calculations in order to reach a consensus. 
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5 CONDUCT OF THE EXPERT PANEL 
 
5.1 Expert Panel Sessions 
 
One of the key outputs of the expert panel is to consider the safety significance of the 
segments or elements. During the expert panel sessions, this evaluation should be 
made not only with reference to risk insights, but also other considerations, such as 
traditional engineering evaluations, sensitivity studies, operational experience, 
engineering judgment, and current regulatory requirements. 
 
It is responsibility of the panel leader to make sure that all participants have the 
possibility to express their opinions, and that the discussions are documented, 
especially conflicting opinions.  
 
All changes proposed to the initial risk ranking should be justified and clearly 
documented as part of the panel process. 
 
If the expert panel is an independent review body, it could invite — as necessary — 
the technical experts or engineers who have been personally involved in the RI-ISI 
analyses to present their results and to answer technical questions. If the panel is 
formed for an internal review, these experts should already be members of the panel. 
 
The crucial elements of risk ranking are the failure probability and failure 
consequences analyses. These should be reviewed in detail during the expert panel 
sessions. 
 
5.1.1 Review of the failure probability assessment 
 
A structural/material engineer who has been involved in the failure probability 
assessment should present the analysis of failure potential to the panel. 
 
As a minimum, the following questions should be addressed in the panel discussion: 
 
• What are the possible degradation mechanisms? 
• What stressors (loadings, chemistry, temperature) are affecting the element? 
• What are the material properties (relevant to degradation potential)? 
• What are the main uncertainties in the analysis? 
 
5.1.2 Review of the consequence analysis 
 
An expert who has been involved in the consequence assessment should present the 
consequence analysis to the panel.  
 
As a minimum, the following questions should be addressed in the panel discussion: 
 
• What are the consequences of a leak and a break? For example: 
- What safety functions are supported by the system? 
- What other systems are impacted by the failure of this system? 
- Address core damage and containment performance (e.g. isolation, 
bypass) 
• What are the main uncertainties in the analysis? 
• What is the resulting quantitative estimate or ranking? 
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Specific attention should also be paid to the following issues: 
 
• What were the limitations of the PSA model with respect to the consequence 
analysis of the element/segment in question? In particular, does the PSA 
cover external events and low power and shutdown conditions? 
• Do operator actions have an impact on the consequence analysis, and how 
they were treated? 
• How have indirect impacts (pipe whips, flooding, etc.) been evaluated? 
 
 
5.1.3 Review of risk ranking results  
 
An engineer who has been involved in the risk ranking process should present the 
analysis to the panel.  
 
As a minimum, the following questions should be addressed in the panel discussion:  
 
• What are the impacts of assumptions in the failure potential and consequence 
assessment on the risk ranking results? 
• What are the impacts of uncertainties in the failure potential and consequence 
assessment on the risk ranking results? 
• How is defence-in-depth maintained? 
• Is consideration of strategies other than inspection appropriate? 
 
 
5.2 Panel decision 
 
As described above, the panel should make a decision, based on the review of the 
analyses, on whether the initial scope of analysis and classification of the segment 
can be approved or not. 
 
The panel members should have received the complete documentation of all piping 
segments and all the additional information required for decision-making. However, 
the panel might identify specific needs for additional background information or 
analyses. In such cases, the decision should be postponed until the required 
additional input is obtained. The project leader is responsible for collecting the 
additional information and distributing it to the panel. 
 
The decisions taken by the expert panel should be reached by consensus. 
Consensus means that unanimous acceptance or agreement is obtained among the 
panel members.  
 
If a unanimous decision cannot be reached, the panel should identify the reasons 
behind the differing opinions. Whenever possible, the panel should take appropriate 
measures (for instance, obtain additional information, request additional analyses, 
etc.) to facilitate a convergence of the differing views.  
 
Rules should be agreed upon at the beginning of the expert panel process to allow a 
conclusive decision to be reached in the eventuality that a unanimous decision cannot 
be achieved even after additional information has been gathered.  
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For instance, it could be considered sufficient to have a two-thirds majority of the 
members for decision-making. The panel leader should allow enough time between 
sessions for deliberation. If a sufficient majority still cannot be reached, the 
chairperson could take the final decision, for instance by shifting a segment or a 
structural element to a higher risk category. 
 
A complete record of the proceedings and of the final decisions should be kept, 
documenting in particular those instances where a consensus was not reached and 
the reasons why. Every member of the panel should have the right to have an opinion 
officially recorded. 
 
 
6 DOCUMENTATION OF THE EXPERT PANEL 
 
For the acceptance of the RI-ISI, it is essential that the justifications of the risk-
informed selection to be included in or excluded from the ISI programme are 
documented transparently so that the bases for decisions can be traced and audited. 
It is important to record the panel decisions in sufficient detail so that problematic 
issues may be easily understood at a later stage by others who were not present 
during the panel sessions. 
 
Therefore, the documentation of the expert panel should include, as a minimum, the 
following information: 
 
• description of the panel participants (for each, name and a summary of the 
relevant expertise); 
• summary of the final classification of the elements/segments; 
• justifications for changes; 
• relevant discussions and conflicting opinions; 
• additional information supplied to the panel; 
• supporting documentation and calculations. 
 
Any other document concerning issues related to the analyses and risk ranking 
prepared by any one of the panel members should also be annexed to the report. 
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ACRONYMS 
 
CDF: Core Damage Frequency  
COF:  Consequence of Failure 
ENIQ: European Network for Inspection and Qualification  
HPI: High Pressure Injection  
ISI: In-Service Inspection  
JRC: Joint Research Centre  
LERF: Large Early Release Frequency  
LLOCA: Large Loss of Coolant Accident 
LOCA: Loss of Coolant Accident 
LPI: Low Pressure Injection  
MLOCA: Medium Loss of Coolant Accident 
NDE: Non-Destructive Evaluation  
NPP: Nuclear Power Plant  
NRWG: Nuclear Regulators Working Group  
OA: Operator Action  
POF: Probability of Failure 
PSA: Probabilistic Safety Assessment  
RAW: Risk Achievement Worth  
RHR: Residual Heat Removal  
RI-ISI: Risk Informed In-Service Inspection 
RPV: Reactor Pressure Vessel  
RRW: Risk Reduction Worth  
SLOCA: Small Loss of Coolant Accident  
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APPENDIX 1 — EXAMPLE OF EXPERT PANEL WORKSHEET 
 
 
 Expert Panel Worksheet SEGMENT: XX-XXX-XXX 
System and Pipe Segment Identification 
System Name: Reactor coolant system 
Segment Description: Loop 1 (hot leg), main coolant piping (29”) from RPV RCPCRV -01 to 
SG RCPCSG-01 
Drawing Number: 3007772 C3 
Direct Consequence Description 
Without Operator Action: 
Initiator: None [RCNone] 
 
Mitigating System: None [RCNone] 
 
Initiator + Mitigating: Large, medium or small LOCA and loss of LPR and HPR to hot leg loop 1 
and RHR train from hot leg loop 1 [RC001] 
With Operator Action: 
Initiator: None [RCNone] 
  
Mitigating System: None [RCNone] 
  
Initiator + Mitigating: No change [RCSame] 
Containment Performance Impact:  
Indirect Consequence Description 
Without operator action: 
Initiator: None 
 
Mitigating system: None 
 
Initiator + Mitigating: None 
With operator action: 
No change 
Comments 
LPI/HPI to hot legs is normally not used. Transfer to hot legs takes place after approximately 5 
hours in recirculation mode 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Continues next page) 
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 Expert Panel Worksheet  SEGMENT: XX-XXX-XXX 
Failure Probability 
Failure Mechanism: Thermal Fatigue 
Comments: Large LOCA = 60 000 l/min, Medium LOCA = 6 600 l/min, Small 
LOCA = 300 l/min 
  
 Test Interval: Continuous 
  
Failure Probability (Basis for Failure Probability, see failure probability) 
 Small Leak Case Large Leak Cases 
 W/O ISI With ISI Probability Type W/O ISI With ISI 
 4.62E-07 4.06E-12 Large LOCA 1.48E-08 7.07E-11 
 Medium LOCA 1.48E-08 7.07E-11 
 Small LOCA 1.48E-08 7.07E-11 
Conditional Treatment, CDF and LERF Importance Measure Calculations 
 
Treatment: LLOCA Without OA With OA 
Conditional CDF due to Pressure Boundary Failure 4.05E-02 4.05E-02 
Conditional LERF due to Pressure Boundary Failure 2.44E-03 2.44E-03 
 
Treatment:  MLOCA Without OA With OA 
Conditional CDF due to Pressure Boundary Failure 1.60E-02 1.60E-02 
Conditional LERF due to Pressure Boundary Failure 4.87E-04 4.87E-04 
 
Treatment:  SLOCA Without OA With OA 
Conditional CDF due to Pressure Boundary Failure 4.74E-03 4.74E-03 
Conditional LERF due to Pressure Boundary Failure 1.98E-04 1.98E-04 
 
CDF and IMPORTANCE MEASURE CALCULATIONS Without OA With OA 
Total Segment Pressure Boundary Failure Core 
Damage Frequency (FP * CDFcond) 
1.19E-10 1.19E-10 
                                                           CDFpb  RAW 8.22E+03 2.28E+04 
Importance Measure Values     RRW 1.000 1.000 
 
LERF and IMPORTANCE MEASURE CALCULATIONS Without OA With OA 
Total Segment Pressure Boundary Failure Large 
Early Release Frequency (FP * LERFcond) 
6.07E-12 6.07E-12 
                                                           
LERFpb  
RAW 2.83E+03 4.47E+04 
Importance Measure Values     RRW 1.000 1.000 
Risk Category:               HIGH SAFETY SIGNIFICANT      LOW SAFETY SIGNIFICANT 
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APPENDIX 2 — OVERVIEW OF PUBLISHED ENIQ 
RECOMMENDED PRACTICES (RP): TITLES AND ABSTRACTS 
 
The ENIQ Recommended Practices may be downloaded at: http://safelife.jrc.nl/eniq/.  
Influential/essential parameters, EUR 18101  RP1 
RP1 should assist those involved in inspection qualification in how to use and 
implement the concept of influential/essential parameters in the spirit of the European 
methodology. The main objectives of this RP are to: 
• explain the proposed concept of influential/essential parameters 
• indicate how the concept could be used in inspection qualification in accordance 
with the European methodology 
• give advice concerning the classification of influential parameters 
• give examples of parameters which can be influential as a function of the specific 
inspection to be qualified for two cases: an ultrasonic inspection of welds and an 
eddy current inspection of steam generator tubes. 
 
Recommended contents for a technical justification, EUR 18099 RP2 
RP 2 defines a list of recommended contents for writing technical justifications. It 
should help anyone producing technical justifications to identify the material that might 
be included. It should also assist in producing technical justifications in a uniform 
format throughout Europe. 
 
Strategy document for technical justification, EUR 18100 RP3 
The purpose of this RP is to describe a strategy on how to use and implement the 
concept of technical justification, which is an important element of the ENIQ European 
methodology for qualification of NDT. The main objectives are to: 
• explain the different purposes of technical justifications 
• indicate how the specific purpose or application of the technical 
justification may affect its contents 
• give guidance on the relative weight which has to be given to test piece 
trials and technical justification, taking into account a number of factors, 
such as level, available evidence, specific application, etc. 
 
Recommended contents for the qualification dossier, EUR 18685 RP4 
This RP should help anyone carrying out qualifications to identify the material which 
might be included in the qualification dossier, which is defined as an assembly of all 
the information relevant to the definition and execution of the qualification. It should also 
assist in producing qualification dossiers in a uniform format throughout Europe, an 
essential element in providing a general framework for a scheme of recognition of 
qualifications performed in the EU. Note that the concept of dossier is not that of a 
single document or report but rather that of a file in which key documents of the 
qualification are inserted. 
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Guidelines for the design of test pieces and conduct of test piece trials, EUR 18686 RP5 
The purpose of RP5 is to provide guidelines for the design of test pieces and the 
conduct of test piece trials, once it is has been decided (for example, as a result of the 
analysis carried out in the technical justification) that they are required. It refers 
especially to test piece trials (open or blind) that are supervised by the qualification 
body. 
 
The use of modelling in inspection qualification, EUR 19017 RP6 
This RP deals with the use of mathematical modelling in inspection qualification. 
Mathematical models have been developed by several organisations for various 
inspection situations and, where applicable, can provide valuable evidence of 
inspection capability for inclusion in a technical justification. Authors of technical 
justifications may therefore consider the use of models. This RP provides advice on: 
• the types and range of mathematical models which are available 
• how the models can be used to generate evidence for a technical justification 
• important considerations and constraints in using models. 
 
Recommended general requirements for a body operating qualification of non-
destructive tests, EUR 20395 
RP7 
The document provides guidance on the minimum criteria that a body operating 
qualification of non-destructive testing should follow if it is to be recognised as 
impartial, independent of operational pressures, competent and reliable. Three types 
of qualification body are considered within the RP: 
Type 1:  A qualification body which is an independent third party organisation 
Type 3:  A qualification body which is an independent part of the utility’s organisation 
set up on a permanent or long-term basis 
Type 3:  An ad hoc qualification body set up for a specific qualification. 
The RP is mainly intended to provide guidance on the requirements for qualification 
bodies of types 1 and 2. An ad hoc qualification body, type 3, being more temporary 
and inspection-specific in nature, will generally be established in a less formal way 
than qualification bodies of types 1 and 2. However, many parts of the RP should still 
provide useful guidance for setting up an ad hoc qualification body. 
The RP should assist those who want to establish a qualification body and those who 
have to audit the competence of a qualification body. It should also assist in providing 
a general framework for a scheme of recognition of qualifications performed in the 
European Union (EU). 
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Qualification Levels and Qualification Approaches, EUR 21761 RP8 
RP8 provides guidance on the setting of the Qualification Level and on determining 
the Qualification Approach based partly on this choice of level. In practice, 
qualification can be carried out with varying degrees of complexity and cost. 
The qualification approach determines to what extent the various aspects of 
qualification, i.e. technical justification, open trials, blind trials ,etc., are included in a 
particular case. The main reason for introducing the concept of varying the 
qualification approach is to give those involved in the qualification process the 
flexibility to decide and agree how much work or evidence is required to qualify a 
particular inspection. The standard to which qualification is carried out should always 
be very high and it is not the intention to vary the qualification approach to undermine 
this principle.  
 
Recommended Verification and Validation of Structural Reliability Models and 
Associated Software to be Used in Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection Programmes, 
EUR 22228 
RP9 
Structural Reliability Models (SRMs) are commonly used to evaluate failure 
probabilities in the development of Risk-Informed In-service Inspection (RI-ISI) 
programmes. This report summarises the Verification and Validation (V&V) 
requirements that a Structural Reliability Model (SRM) and associated software 
should satisfy in order to be suitable for such purpose. These requirements are mainly 
based on the work performed within the NURBIM project.  
 
Personnel Qualification  RP10 
Under preparation 
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Abstract 
The European Framework Document for Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection is 
intended to provide general guidelines to utilities on how to develop RI-ISI approaches 
and use or adapt already established approaches to the European nuclear 
environment, while taking account of utility-specific characteristics and national 
regulatory requirements. 
 
The Framework Document recommends the use of an expert panel to review the 
selection of safety-significant sites before the inspection programme is finalised. 
However, more detailed guidance regarding the responsibilities, composition and 
working procedures of an expert panel is not provided.  
 
This ENIQ recommended practice is meant to assist users of RI-ISI applications in 
how to form, prepare and facilitate an expert panel whose final goal is to take 
decisions concerning the inclusion or exclusion of sites from the risk-informed 
inspection programme. A recommended practice is a document produced by ENIQ to 
support the higher level Framework Document. Users are free to use these 
recommended practices at national level, as they see fit. 
 
The main objectives of this recommended practice are to give guidance on: 
Composition of the expert panel; Responsibilities of the expert panel; Planning and 
preparation of the expert panel; Conduct of the expert panel; Documentation of the 
expert panel. 
   
The mission of the Joint Research Centre is to provide customer-driven scientific and technical 
support for the conception, development, implementation and monitoring of EU policies. As a 
service of the European Commission, the JRC functions as a reference centre of science and 
technology for the Union. Close to the policy-making process, it serves the common interest of 
the Member States, while being independent of special interests, whether private or national. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
